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Non‐technical summary 
The comparison between growth‐maximizing and welfare‐maximizing fiscal policy over the long run is a 
central  issue  in models of public  finance  and  endogenous  growth.  It  is  also  important  from  a  policy‐
making  perspective:  although  the  maximization  of  welfare  is  typically  characterized  as  the  primary 
objective of benevolent governments, imperfect knowledge about the preferences of households make 
it  difficult  to  pursue  a  first‐best  strategy  to  achieve  this.  An  obvious  second‐best  strategy,  because 
changes in income are easier to measure than welfare, is a policy of growth maximization. As a further 
complication, policy makers often perceive a distinction between the provision of social public services 
necessary  to meet  objectives  related  to  social welfare  and  those  expenditures  necessary  to  achieve 
higher growth rates. Discussions of this nature feature frequently in policy debates. 
This paper uses models of public  finance and growth  to evaluate  the extent of  the  trade‐off between 
growth  and  welfare  maximization  in  the  absence  of  redistributive  issues,  and  therefore  the  policy 
conclusions with  respect  to  the optimal  tax  rate and  the optimal  level of public  spending  that can be 
drawn,  from  two perspectives. The  first  compares  the welfare‐maximizing and growth‐maximizing  tax 
rates  found  under  different  assumptions  in  models  of  public  finance  and  growth.  In  so  doing  we 
synthesize as well as extend the theoretical literature. A key outcome of this exercise is to highlight the 
range of conclusions that can be drawn from this class of theoretical models. The growth‐maximizing tax 
rate can be  the same as, higher, or  lower than the welfare‐maximizing equivalent, as a result of small 
changes  in model  assumptions  about  the nature of  the  effects  of  fiscal policy  and  the  technology of 
private production.  
The  second  perspective  on  the  question  of  the  trade‐off  between  growth  and welfare maximization 
considers the extent to which growth and welfare maximization yield distinct outcomes in terms of the 
growth rates and welfare levels along the balanced growth path. This is a question that is often ignored 
in  the  literature,  even  though  ultimately,  differences  in  outcomes  represent  the  main  trade‐off  of 
interest arising  from growth versus welfare maximization objectives. The results  from this exercise are 
striking and serve to modify the policy conclusions that might be drawn from the first part of the paper. 
Even when the differences between the tax rate necessary to maximize growth compared to the tax rate 
under welfare maximization are  relatively  large, we  find  that  this  translates  into differences  in growth 
rates that are relatively small, and  in some cases, they also translate  into relatively small differences  in 
welfare levels.  
We establish that this holds for a large array of possible parameter combinations and therefore appears 
to be robust. Particularly in models with public services, this suggests that growth maximization may be a 
suitable second‐best strategy for benevolent governments. It occurs in part because the growth rate is a 
central determinant of welfare, but also because policy  is relatively  ineffective around the welfare and 
growth maxima. Hence,  though previous models  in  the  literature predict differences between welfare 
and  growth  maximization  in  a  number  of  settings,  we  quantify  these  differences  in  our  extended 
framework  and  show  that  differences  in  outcomes  may  be  small.  One  inference  is  that  in  practice 
differences between growth and welfare maximization may not be a major concern such that some of 
the results in the existing literature overemphasize this dichotomy.  
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Der Vergleich von langfristig wachstumsmaximierender und wohlfahrtsmaximierender Fiskalpolitik ist ein 
zentraler  Gegenstand  von  endogenen  Wachstumsmodellen,  in  denen  Fiskalpolitik  die  langfristige 
Wachstumsrate  der  Volkswirtschaft  beeinflusst.  Dieser  Vergleich  ist  ebenfalls  wichtig  aus  einer 
wirtschaftspolitischen  Perspektive:  Obwohl  die  Maximierung  von  Wohlfahrt  normalerweise  das  Ziel 
wohlwollender  Regierungen  ist,  kann  unvollständige  Information  hinsichtlich  der  Präferenzen  der 
Haushalte die Verfolgung einer erstbesten Strategie deutlich erschweren. Die offensichtlich zweitbeste 
Strategie besteht darin, Wachstum zu maximieren, da Outputänderungen  leichter zu messen sind und 
Wachstum  eine  zentrale  Determinante  von  Wohlfahrt  ist.  Allerdings  neigen  politische  Akteure  dazu, 
einen Gegensatz  zwischen der Bereitstellung  von  sozialen öffentlichen Dienstleistungen  zur  Erhöhung 
der  Wohlfahrt  und  von  produktiven  öffentlichen  Dienstleistungen  zur  Erhöhung  von 
Wirtschaftswachstum  zu  sehen.  Dieser  wahrgenommene  Gegensatz wird  entsprechend  oft  öffentlich 
debattiert. 
Diese  Studie  benutzt  endogene  Wachstumsmodelle  mit  öffentlichen  Finanzen,  um  die  Zielkonflikte 
zwischen der Maximierung von Wachstum und Wohlfahrt aus zwei Perspektiven zu evaluieren, wobei die 
Verteilung von Einkommen allerdings ignoriert wird. In der ersten Perspektive wird der wohlfahrts‐ und 
wachstumsmaximierende Steuersatz unter unterschiedlichen Modellannahmen verglichen. Ein zentrales 
Ergebnis dieser Analyse besteht darin, dass mögliche optimale Steuersätze eine erhebliche Bandbreite 
haben  können.  Der  wachstumsmaximierende  Steuersatz  kann  –  abhängig  von  den  Modellannahmen 
hinsichtlich  der  Produktionstechnologie  und  der  Effekte  öffentlicher  Ausgaben  –  dem 
wohlfahrtsmaximierenden Steuersatz entsprechen, aber auch darüber oder darunter liegen. 
In  der  zweiten  Perspektive  wird  untersucht,  ob  Wachstums‐  und  Wohlfahrtsmaximierung  zu 
unterschiedlichen Outcomes hinsichtlich der Höhe des Wachstums‐ und des Wohlfahrtniveaus    führen. 
Unterschiede  bei  den  Outcomes  werden  nur  selten  in  der  Literatur  analysiert,  obwohl  diese 
letztenendlich das Ausmaß von Zielkonflikten bestimmen. Die Ergebnisse dieser Analyse modifizieren die 
Schlussfolgerungen,  die  im  ersten  Teil  des  Papiers  gezogen  werden:  Während  große  Unterschiede 
zwischen  wachstums‐  und  wohlfahrtsmaximierenden  Steuersätzen  bestehen  können,  sind  die 
Unterschiede zwischen den Wachstumsraten und  in einigen Fällen zwischen den Stufen des erreichten 
Wohlfahrtniveaus unter beiden Politikzielen gering.  
Wir zeigen, dass diese Schlussfolgerungen für eine große Anzahl von verschiedenen Modellparametern 
robust  sind.  Dies  impliziert,  dass  Wachstumsmaximierung  eine  mögliche  zweitbeste  Strategie  für 
wohlwollende  Regierungen  ist.  Dies  kann  dadurch  erklärt  werden,  dass  Fiskalpolitik  zwischen  den 
Wachstums‐ und Wohlfahrtsmaxima relativ ineffektiv ist. Diese Schlussfolgerungen relativieren ebenfalls 
einige  Ergebnisse  von  vorherigen  Studien,  die  zeigen,  dass  Unterschiede  zwischen  Wachstums‐  und 
Wohlfahrtsmaximierung bestehen. Eine  Implikation dieser Ergebnisse besteht darin, dass  in der Praxis 
die  Unterschiede  zwischen  Wachstums‐  und  Wohlfahrtsmaximierung  nicht  zu  sehr  betont  werden 
sollten.  
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1 Introduction
The comparison between growth-maximizing and welfare-maximizing scal
policy over the long run is a central issue in models of public nance and
endogenous growth. It is also important from a policy-making perspective:
although the maximization of welfare is typically characterized as the pri-
mary objective of benevolent governments, imperfect knowledge about the
preferences of households make it di¢ cult to pursue a rst-best strategy to
achieve this. An obvious second-best strategy, because changes in income
are easier to measure than welfare, is a policy of growth maximization. As
a further complication, policy makers often perceive a distinction between
the provision of social public services necessary to meet objectives related
to social welfare and those expenditures necessary to achieve higher growth
rates. Discussions of this nature feature frequently in policy debates, such as
with respect to appropriate scal policies for developing countries.1
This paper uses models of public nance and growth to evaluate the extent
of the trade-o¤ between growth and welfare maximization, and therefore
the policy conclusions with respect to the optimal tax rate and the optimal
level of public spending that can be drawn, from these two perspectives.
The rst compares the welfare-maximizing and growth-maximizing tax rates
found under di¤erent assumptions in models of public nance and growth.
In so doing we synthesize as well as extend the theoretical literature. A
key outcome of this exercise is to highlight the range of conclusions that
can be drawn from this class of theoretical models. The growth-maximizing
tax rate can be the same as, higher, or lower than the welfare-maximizing
equivalent, as a result of small changes in model assumptions about the
nature of the e¤ects of scal policy and the technology of private production.
As a consequence, well known results in the existing literature are not robust
to small changes in their underlying assumptions. These include the Barro
1See for example IMF and World Bank (2007). For instance, the Tanzanian National
Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty contains a cluster for Growth and the
reduction of income povertyand another cluster on Improved quality of life and social
well-beingthat both list the provision of various public services and various types of public
investment. The division into two clusters reects the perception that there are trade-o¤s.
2
(1990) model with a ow of productive public services where the growth-
and welfare-maximizing tax rates coincide, and the Futagami et al. (1993)
model with productive public capital, where the growth-maximizing tax rate
exceeds the welfare-maximizing tax rate.2
We examine the trade-o¤s between growth and welfare maximization us-
ing two alternative endogenous growth models. One is a generalization of the
Barro (1990) model (i.e. the government provides public services) while the
other generalizes the Futagami et al. (1993) model (i.e. the government accu-
mulates public capital). We make two extensions to these frameworks. In the
rst extension we allow for the possibility that public services or public cap-
ital entail mixed e¤ects; the same public service/capital may simultaneously
be productive as well as utility-enhancing. A given type of health or educa-
tion spending, for example, may often simultaneously enhance private sector
output or productivity and target social welfare objectives. In developing
countries where the government typically provides more rudimentary public
services, arguably there are few public services that entail purely productive
or purely utility-enhancing e¤ects.3
In the second extension, we allow for greater complementarity between
productive public services and private capital than in the Cobb-Douglas case
(the elasticity of substitution is assumed to be less than one). Public services
provided by the government fundamentally di¤er from private inputs, such
that it may be very costly for rms to substitute for them. For example, poor
quality road surfaces may require rms to purchase special, more expensive,
vehicles for the transportation of goods.
We consider various combinations of these assumptions. While the pres-
ence of mixed e¤ects increases the welfare-maximizing tax rate relative to the
2Throughout the chapter, the term Barro Modelrefers to the main model developed
in Barro (1990), and the term Futagami Modelrefers to the model developed in Futagami
et al. (1993). The term public servicesdenotes public services derived from the ow of
public spending, whereas the term public capitalis equivalent to public services derived
from the stock of public capital.
3For example, public transportation infrastructure may not only be productive because
it facilitates access to hospitals and primary health facilities but may also be productive
because it ensures that the labour force remains t for work. Agénor and Neanidis (2006)
provide a survey of empirical evidence on the impact of health on growth and the impact
of infrastructure on health outcomes.
3
growth-maximizing equivalent, complementarity tends to have the opposite
e¤ects. This implies that combining both additions lead to potentially more
interesting results because they serve to increase the ambiguity of the con-
clusion regarding the relationship between growth- and welfare-maximizing
tax rates. Since closed-form solutions cannot be obtained in most cases, it
is shown numerically that with public capital that entails mixed e¤ects, the
Futagami et al. (1993) results no longer holds, and that with a higher degree
of complementarity the same is true for the Barro (1990) result that growth-
and welfare-maximizing scal policies are identical. It is therefore the deriva-
tion of optimal scal policy under growth and welfare maximization in these
types of settings with complementarity and mixed public spending e¤ects
which is our rst contribution.
The second perspective on the question of the trade-o¤ between growth
and welfare maximization considers the extent to which growth and welfare
maximization yield distinct outcomes in terms of the growth rates and wel-
fare levels along the balanced growth path. This is a question that is often
ignored in the literature, even though ultimately, di¤erences in outcomes
represent the main trade-o¤ of interest arising from growth versus welfare
maximization objectives. This analysis is provided through numerical simu-
lations of policies and outcomes under growth and welfare maximization for
a wide range of parameter sets that nest di¤erent degrees of complementarity
between public services/capital and private capital.
The results from this exercise are striking and serve to modify the policy
conclusions that might be drawn from the rst part of the paper. Even when
the di¤erences between the tax rate necessary to maximize growth compared
to welfare maximization are relatively large, we nd that this translates into
di¤erences in growth rates that are relatively small. For models with public
services, they also translate into relatively small di¤erences in welfare levels.
This conclusion is also likely to hold for models with public capital. That is,
even where there is uncertainty about how a particular form of public service
or capital a¤ects the production function or the utility function, in practice
growth maximization yields growth outcomes (and in many cases, welfare
outcomes) that are very close to those found under welfare maximization.
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We establish that this holds for a large array of possible parameter com-
binations and therefore appears to be robust. Particularly in models with
public services, this suggests that growth maximization may be a suitable
second-best strategy for benevolent governments. It occurs in part because
the growth rate is a central determinant of welfare, but also because policy
is relatively ine¤ective around the welfare and growth maxima. Large di¤er-
ences in scal policy suggested by growth and welfare optimization translate
into small growth and welfare di¤erences. This result occurs in a class of
models that ensure long-run impacts of scal policy, and which has typically
formed the reference point for much theoretical discussion and empirical test-
ing of the impacts of scal policy and long-run growth.4
Hence, though previous models in the literature predict di¤erences be-
tween welfare and growth maximization in a number of settings, we quantify
these di¤erences in our extended framework and show that di¤erences in out-
comes may be small. One inference is that in practice di¤erences between
growth and welfare maximization may not be a major concern such that
some of the results in the existing literature overemphasize this dichotomy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops
the models and derives the equilibrium in the market economy. Section 3
compares the growth- and welfare-maximizing tax rates, while Section 4 uses
numerical examples to compare growth rates and welfare levels along the bal-
anced growth path (under both growth and welfare maximization). Finally,
Section 5 summarizes the results and discusses some policy implications.
2 Theoretical Framework
The public nance growth framework we adopt is based on Barro (1990) and
Futagami et al. (1993). We assume a large number of identical and innitely
lived households normalized to one, and zero population growth. The house-
hold produces a single composite good which can be used for consumption or
physical capital accumulation. We develop two distinct models (1 and 2) in
order to obtain more general conclusions about the extent and nature of the
4See Turnovsky (2004) for a more extenive discussion.
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trade-o¤s between growth and welfare maximization that can arise in this
class of models.
In Model 1, the government provides public services which are derived
from the ow of public spending. To incorporate the notion of comple-
mentarity between private and public services, the production function is a
generalized version of that found in Barro (1990). Output is produced us-
ing private capital (k) and a non-rival and non-excludable productive public
service (g) based on CES technology:
y = (k + g)
1
 (1)
where  = 1  . The parameter  determines the elasticity of substitution
given by:
s =
1
1   (2)
The government levies a proportional tax on output at rate  , to provide
public services. Hence:
g = y (3)
The instantaneous utility function is
u(c; g) =
(gc1 )1 
1   (4)
where, unlike Barro (1990), productive public spending, g, also directly enters
the utility function.5 The market equilibrium in Model 1 can be characterized
as follows. The representative household chooses the consumption path to
maximize lifetime utility U given by
U =
Z 1
0
u(c(t); g(t))e tdt (5)
subject to the production function and the households resource constraint
taking  , g and k0 as given.6
5In an extension to his main model, Barro (1990) allows for a di¤erent non-productive
public spending category, h, to a¤ect household utility.
6In addition, the transversality condition has to be fullled. This is the case irrespective
of the policy choice if  > 1 which we assume throughout the paper. The time subscript
is omitted whenever possible. A dot over the variable denotes its derivative with respect
to time.
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Using the rst-order conditions and noting that there are no transitional
dynamics in this model, so that c, k and y all grow at the same constant rate
, the growth rate can be written as
 =
_c
c
=
1

((1  )yk   ) (6)
Since  does not enter the latter expression, it can be noted that in the
market economy the presence of mixed e¤ects of public services does not
a¤ect the growth rate.
In Model 2, the government accumulates public capital. Similar to Model
1, we assume a generalized version of the production function in Futagami
et al. (1993), who assume that output is a function of public capital (kG), to
allow for public-private complementarity, such that (1) is rewritten as:
y = (k + kG)
1
 (7)
Similarly, (3) and (4) become:
_kG = y (8)
and
u(c; kG) =
(kGc
1 )1 
1   (9)
In this case, the market equilibrium can be characterized as follows. The
representative household now maximizes lifetime utility given by
U =
Z 1
0
u(c(t); kG(t))e
 tdt (10)
subject to (7) and the households resource constraint taking  , kG > 0 and
k0 > 0 as given.
Using the rst-order conditions, it can be shown that along the balanced
growth path, the growth rate has to satisfy
 =
_c
c
=
1

((1  )yk   ) (11)
but which is not a closed-form solution of  because now yk is a function
of . Along the lines of Futagami et al. (1993), it can be shown that the
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equilibrium of the model is saddlepoint stable within the relevant parameter
ranges, and that the balanced growth path is unique. As above,  does not
enter (11).
Di¤erent values of the exogenous parameters in Models 1 and 2 can gen-
erate di¤erent implications about the extent of the utility-enhancing e¤ects
of public spending and about the extent of complementarity between pub-
lic and private inputs to production. Public spending simultaneously a¤ects
private production and utility if  > 0 and  > 0. If  < 0, the elasticity
of substitution is smaller than in the case of Cobb-Douglas technology, and
private capital and public inputs are complements. In contrast, with  = 0,
public spending is solely productive, and with  = 0, output is produced us-
ing Cobb-Douglas technology such that Model 1 is identical to Barro (1990),
and Model 2 is identical to Futagami et al. (1993). Obviously, constraining
either  or  to zero, it is also possible to generate versions of Models 1 and 2
that either incorporate mixed e¤ects of public spending or complementarity,
but not both.
3 Fiscal Policy under Growth and Welfare
Maximization
3.1 Model 1
This sub-section derives the growth-maximizing tax rate,  , and the welfare-
maximizing tax rate,  , in di¤erent versions of Model 1 that di¤er with
respect to the assumptions of the e¤ects of public services and the degree
of complementarity.7 The growth-maximizing tax rate maximizes the long-
run growth rate of the economy, whereas the welfare-maximizing tax rate
maximizes lifetime utility of the representative household and is therefore
Ramsey-optimal. We assume that the tax rate is constant over time.
For illustrative purposes, we rst derive the growth- and welfare-maximizing
tax rate under the assumption that  = 0 and  = 0 which corresponds to
the Barro (1990) model and which implies that public spending is solely
7We consider the optimal scal policies in the centralized economy in the appendix.
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productive. Later, we successively add the assumptions of mixed e¤ects of
public spending and complementarity. Maximizing the growth rate in the
Barro Model yields its familiar growth-maximizing tax rate,  :
  =  (12)
In the Barro Model, maximizing output net of taxation at every point of
time yields the same tax rate as maximizing the growth rate. Since lifetime
utility is a function of current consumption which depends on current output
and future consumption which in turn depends on long-run growth, there are
therefore no trade-o¤s between growth maximization and welfare maximiza-
tion in the Barro Model. The growth- and welfare-maximizing tax rates ( 
and  , respectively) therefore coincide:
  =   =  (13)
We now assume that public spending has mixed e¤ects (i.e.  > 0), but
that the technology of production is Cobb-Douglas technology ( = 0). Given
that the production technology has not changed, the growth-maximizing tax
rate,  , corresponds to the previous case where  = 0 because the growth
rate (6) is not a¤ected by the choice of . Hence   = .
The welfare-maximizing tax rate can be calculated as follows. Since there
are no transitional dynamics in Model 1, by taking the integral of (5), lifetime
utility can be expressed as (ignoring the constants):
U =
1
1  
264
 
g
k

x1 
1 
  (1  )
375 (14)
where x = c=k. Maximizing the latter expression yields the welfare-maximizing
tax rate   when  > 0. Since closed-form solutions cannot be obtained, we
compare the growth- and welfare-maximizing tax rate numerically. Speci-
cally, Figure 1 plots the growth- and welfare-maximizing tax rates as func-
tions of  when  = 0. It shows that the welfare-maximizing tax rate ex-
ceeds the growth-maximizing tax rate when output is produced using Cobb-
Douglas technology and when public services are assumed to have mixed
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e¤ects. That is, due to the simultaneous utility-enhancing e¤ect of public
services, higher spending levels are more desirable from a welfare perspective
than from a growth perspective. Figure 1 demonstrates that depending on
the value of , the di¤erence may be sizeable suggesting potentially signif-
icant trade-o¤s for scal policy between growth and welfare maximization.
We refer to this source of trade-o¤ as the utility-enhancement e¤ect.
Next, we assume that public spending has only productive e¤ects ( = 0),
but that private and public inputs are complements. Specically, to simplify
the exposition, we assume that the elasticity of substitution is 1
2
(implying
 =  1), which is halfway between the Cobb-Douglas and Leontief technolo-
gies. This yields a larger (smaller) degree of complementarity between the
inputs to private production than Cobb-Douglas (Leontief) technology. The
growth-maximizing tax rate with  =  1 and  = 0 is
  =
1
2
(
p
2 + 8  ) (15)
While the welfare-maximizing tax rate can be calculated by analogy to the
previous case, there are again no closed-form solutions. Figure 2 compares
the growth- and welfare-maximizing growth rate numerically. It shows that
even when  is constrained to zero and when  =  1, the welfare-maximizing
tax rate no longer matches the growth-maximizing tax rate, with the former
below the latter. As Barro (1990) predicts, the elasticity of substitution
a¤ects the relationship between the welfare and growth-maximizing tax rates.
The reason is that maximizing output net of taxation and hence maximizing
current and future consumption are no longer identical to maximizing the
growth rate. We refer to this as the complementarity e¤ect.
Finally, we assume that public spending has mixed e¤ects ( > 0) and
that private and public inputs to production are complements (i.e.  =
 1 as in the previous case). The growth-maximizing tax rate in this case
corresponds to (15) and is therefore not a¤ected by . As there are no
closed-form solutions for the welfare-maximizing tax rate, we again compare
the growth- and welfare-maximizing tax rate numerically in Figure 2. It
shows that when we allow for mixed public services and for complementarity
(an elasticity of substitution of less than one), we nd that the welfare-
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maximizing tax rate increases with , and its position with regard to the
growth-maximizing tax rate is ambiguous. A smaller elasticity of substitution
lowers the welfare-maximizing tax rate (complementarity e¤ect), whereas it
increases with  (utility-enhancement e¤ect). For low values of , the welfare-
maximizing tax rate is below the growth-maximizing rate, with the reverse
true for high values of .
For illustrative purposes, it is useful to also consider values of  that lie
outside the range of  1 and 0 even though we regard them as less realistic
and hence less relevant. If  = 1, y = k + g implying that private and
public inputs are perfect substitutes. In this case, the growth-maximizing
tax rate is 0 because providing public services imposes a cost in terms of
distortions from income taxation on the economy. With full substitutability,
it would be ine¢ cient to bear these costs under growth maximization which
reects the fact that there is no rationale for government intervention as
public services are not su¢ ciently di¤erent from private inputs. In contrast,
there is still potentially a rationale to set the tax rate above zero when public
spending has mixed e¤ects under welfare maximization.8
For  =  1, the technology of production becomes Leontief so that pub-
lic services and private capital are complete complements: y = min(k; g).
In this setting, there is no long-run output growth irrespective of the level
of taxation. The reason is related to the fact that whereas public services
are derived from the ow of public expenditure only, k is a stock that is
accumulated over time so that in the long run, g - which essentially fully
depreciates after each period - cannot exceed k. In other words, the share
of g in y is necessarily constrained to be lower than one in contrast to the
stock of capital which may exceed the level of output. In turn, g  k im-
plies that private investment has zero marginal returns and does not occur
so that there is neither capital accumulation nor growth over the long-run.
We therefore do not discuss this case further.
8Setting  = 1 and  = 0:3, the welfare-maximizing tax rate would be for instance 0:24
(when the remaining parameters set at the same values as in Figure 2).
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Figure 1: The tax rate as a function of  in Model 1 with  = 0
3.2 Model 2
Analogous to the previous sub-section, this sub-section derives the tax rate
which maximizes growth along the balanced growth path,  , and the welfare-
maximizing tax rate,  , which maximizes lifetime utility in various versions
of Model 2. The latter di¤er with respect to the assumptions about the e¤ects
of public capital (whether they are only growth-enhancing or mixed) and the
elasticity of substitution (whether it is below one or equal to one). This allows
us to show how these assumptions a¤ect the trade-o¤s between growth and
welfare maximization in Model 2 where the governments accumulation of
public capital a¤ects private production.9
Again, for illustrative purposes, we rst derive the growth- and welfare-
maximizing tax rate under the assumption that  = 0 and that  = 0 which
corresponds to the Futagami et al. (1993) model and which implies that
public spending is solely productive. Futagami et al. (1993) have shown
that, in this setting, the growth-maximizing tax rate is
  =  (16)
9Note that while there are transitional dynamics in Model 2, we implicitly assume that
the costs of changing the tax rate are prohibitively high so that the government is only
able to set the tax rate once.
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Figure 2: The tax rate as a function of  in Model 1 with  =  1
Under welfare maximization in the market economy, the government maxi-
mizes (5) subject to the resource constraint of the household and (8) while
taking the rst-order conditions of the households as given. Futagami et al.
(1993) have shown that the growth-maximizing tax rate exceeds the welfare-
maximizing rate. The reason is that when public services are derived from
the stock of public capital, there are transitional dynamics and consumption
is foregone in the process of accumulating public capital (Turnovsky, 1997),
which has adverse consequences for welfare. This implies that maximizing
the level of current output and maximizing the long-run growth rate are no
longer identical. This e¤ect is termed the capital accumulation e¤ectand
arises because of transitional dynamics. Along the lines of Ghosh and Roy
(2004), in the Appendix we derive the conditions that the welfare-maximizing
tax rate has to satisfy. Given that there are no closed-form solutions avail-
able, Figure 3 compares the growth- and welfare-maximizing tax rate under
the assumption that  = 0 and  = 0 and conrms the results of Futagami
et al. (1993) that   <  .
Now assume that public spending has mixed e¤ects ( > 0), but that the
technology of production is Cobb-Douglas ( = 0). Given that the produc-
tion technology has not changed, the growth-maximizing tax rate,  , corre-
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sponds to (16). The welfare-maximizing tax rate can be calculated as shown
in the Appendix, but no closed-form solutions exist.10 We therefore again
use numerical examples to compare the growth- and welfare-maximizing tax
rates in this case in Figure 3. As might be expected from this conguration
of results when we consider the model with mixed public services, the impact
of increasing  on the relative position of the welfare-maximizing tax rate
is ambiguous. The utility-enhancement e¤ect and the capital accumulation
e¤ect oppose each other. For low values of  the welfare-maximizing tax
rate is below the growth-maximizing rate, whereas for high values of  it lies
above it, and there exists a particular value of  when both tax rates are
identical.
Next, we assume that public capital has only productive e¤ects ( = 0),
but that private and public inputs are complements, and as above, the elas-
ticity of substitution is 1
2
. Figure 4 shows that even when  = 0, compared
to the case where there is no complementarity between private and public
capital ( = 0 as in the Futagami Model), the e¤ect of the change in the
assumption with respect to the elasticity of substitution is to accentuate the
di¤erence between the growth- and welfare-maximizing tax rates. Here the
capital accumulation and complementarity e¤ects are reinforcing.
Finally, we consider the case where public spending has mixed e¤ects
( > 0) and private and public inputs to production are complements ( =
 1). Figure 4 compares the growth-maximizing and welfare-maximizing
tax rates. The fact that public capital also a¤ects utility results in the
welfare-maximizing tax rate increasing with  (as when  = 0; see Fig-
ure 3), and its position with regard to the growth-maximizing tax rate is
again ambiguous. The small elasticity of substitution (complementarity ef-
fect) and the capital accumulation e¤ect lower the welfare-maximizing tax
rate, whereas the utility-enhancement e¤ect raises it, such that it crosses the
growth-maximizing tax rate at some point.
For illustrative purposes, we again consider the case of full substitutability
( = 1) or nearly full substitutability and the case of Leontief technology
10As shown in the Appendix, the welfare-maximizing tax rate has to satisfy equations
(A.1), (A.2) and (A.3).
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( =  1). In the former, there is again no rationale for public investment
under growth maximization because it is more e¢ cient to produce private
output solely using private inputs. Under welfare maximization (and with 
set close to 1) and in contrast to Model 1, the optimal tax rate is likewise
approximately zero in many cases even if public capital entails signicant
utility-enhancing e¤ects11. Intuitively, this result arises because the negative
e¤ects of increasing the tax rate (i.e. consumption foregone in the process of
accumulating public capital) exceed the positive e¤ects (i.e. higher utility-
enhancing public services and higher output over the long-run).
In the latter case ( =  1), the growth rate is either 0 or (1   )
depending on whether k is larger or smaller than kG. In contrast to Model
1, a priori, it is unclear whether k > kG and  = 0 or not because kG
is also accumulated over time. Growth is hence maximized with the tax
rate that leads to kG being innitesimally larger than k. However, given the
discontinuous nature of the growth rate, the dynamic properties of the model
are likely to di¤er. Whether there would be a stable growth equilibrium is
therefore unclear; we do not pursue this rather special case further below.
Figure 3: The tax rate as a function of  in Model 2 with  = 0
11For instance, with  = 0:97,  = 0:5, and with all the remaining parameters set as in
Figure 4,   0.
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Figure 4: The tax rate as a function of  in Model 2 with  =  1
3.3 Summary of the Results
The previous sub-sections have shown how the trade-o¤ between growth and
welfare maximization is a¤ected by assumptions with respect to the e¤ects of
public spending and the substitutability between private and public inputs
to production in growth models where the government either provides pub-
lic services derived from the ow of public spending or accumulates public
capital. Table 1 provides an overview of the di¤erent assumptions made.
To summarize, it has been shown that small changes in the underlying
assumptions of the Barro and Futagami Models can lead to fundamentally
di¤erent conclusions from comparisons between the growth- and welfare-
maximizing tax rates. Due to the lack of closed-form solutions in several
versions of the model, this section presented numerical comparisons between
growth and welfare maximization. Specically, we plotted the growth- and
welfare-maximizing tax rates as functions of  under alternative assumptions
in Models 1 and 2. This allows us to compare the growth- and welfare-
maximizing tax rates across a wide range of parameter congurations, and
provides an indication of the magnitude of potential di¤erences.
Without knowledge of the way that public services or capital a¤ect pro-
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duction or utility, governments can neither be sure about whether the welfare-
maximizing tax rate is expected to be above, below or to be the same as the
growth-maximizing tax rate, nor about the size of that di¤erence. Several
generalizations are possible however.
(1) The use of public capital, as in the Futagami Model, tends to yield
outcomes in which the welfare-maximizing tax rate is below the growth-
maximizing rate (capital accumulation e¤ect).
(2) The use of mixedpublic services or public capital - that a¤ect both
production and utility - raises the welfare-maximizing tax rate so that it may
lie above the growth-maximizing rate (utility-enhancement e¤ect).
(3) In models in which the elasticity of substitution between public ser-
vices and private capital is less than one, the welfare-maximizing tax rate
lies below the growth-maximizing rate (complementarity e¤ect).
As a consequence it is possible to generate versions of the endogenous
growth models that di¤er with respect to (a) how public spending a¤ects
private production, (b) whether they also a¤ect utility, and (c) the elasticity
of substitution between private and public inputs to private production, in
which these di¤erences in tax rates are magnied or become ambiguous.
Table 1 summarizes the range of results from alternative assumptions in
Models 1 and 2.
In comparison with the previous literature, to our knowledge no previous
papers compare the growth- and welfare-maximizing tax rates in models that
include mixed e¤ects and allow for complementarity. A few papers have de-
veloped similar models that either assume that public spending has mixed ef-
fects or that there is complementarity between public and private inputs, but
comparisons between growth- and welfare-maximizing scal policies generally
refer to the case of a centralized, rather than market, economy. Examples
of comparisons between growth and welfare maximization in the former type
of models include Balducci (2005), Agénor (2008a) and Agénor (2008b).12
Likewise, a few models consider CES technology within endogenous growth
12Comparing welfare maximizing and growth maximizing scal policies within a model
in which public capital is productive and utility-reducing due to negative welfare e¤ects
of growth (pollution) is proposed for further research by Greiner and Kuhn (2005).
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models with public spending; see Devarajan et al. (1996), Baier and Glomm
(2001) and Ott and Turnovsky (2006). However, as we demonstrate above,
it is the combination of these features that leads to ambiguous, and therefore
potentially more interesting, results with respect to the di¤erence between
growth and welfare maximization. As an exception, Chatterjee and Ghosh
(2009) develop a model that includes both complementarity and mixed e¤ect
features, but they do not derive results for growth- versus welfare-maximizing
scal policies.13
Our results also markedly contrast with the those of Barro (1990), Lau
(1995), Greiner and Hanusch (1998) and Park and Philippopoulous (2002),
who assume that growth-enhancing and utility-enhancing public services are
distinct. In these models, the welfare-maximizing tax rate can be expected
to be well above the growth-maximizing equivalent because the utlitity-
enhancing public services impose additional public spending requirements on
the government under welfare maximization compared to the case of growth
maximization where the e¤ects of these public services are ignored by the
government.14 These types of models may well exaggerate the di¤erence be-
tween both tax rates in the light of the evidence that many public services
have mixed e¤ects, especially in developing countries.
4 Growth Rates and Welfare Levels under
Growth and Welfare Maximization
In this section we turn to the comparison of the outcomes that result from
the di¤erent versions of the public nance and growth models considered
above. In particular we are interested in whether the ambiguous nature of
13The features of our model and the focus of our analysis imply that our results are
not comparable to those obtained within the broader literature on optimal taxation which
we dene to include studies such as Chari et al. (1994) either. Apart from the fact that
in these models long-run growth does typically not arise, the focus of their analysis is to
determine the optimal structure of taxation, where typically, public spending requirements
are exogenously given. In contrast, our focus is to determine the optimal level of public
spending when public spending entails growth-enhancing and utility-enhancing e¤ects.
14This holds as long as utility is positive in the absence of utility-enhancing public
services.
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Table 1: Model summary
Relationship Description
Model   between of
  and   Assumptions
Model 1  = 0  = 0   =   Barro Model
Model 1  > 0  = 0   <   mixed e¤ects
Model 1  = 0  =  1   >   complementarity
Model 1  > 0  =  1 ambiguous mixed e¤ects&complementarity
Model 2  = 0  = 0   >   Futagami Model
Model 2  > 0  = 0 ambiguous mixed e¤ects
Model 2  = 0  =  1   >   complementarity
Model 2  > 0  =  1 ambiguous mixed e¤ects&complementarity
the di¤erences in tax rates with welfare and growth maximization translate
into large or small di¤erences in outcomes. We perform this exercise by
quantifying di¤erences between the growth rates and welfare levels along
the balanced growth path under growth and welfare maximization. The
motivation is that while the extent of trade-o¤s between both government
objectives is ultimately determined by di¤erences in outcomes, most papers
solely focus on di¤erences in policies. Given that there are no transitional
dynamics in Model 1, limiting the discussion to the balanced growth path
is not problematic. In Model 2, transitional dynamics arise, and welfare
levels along the balanced growth path are not identical to lifetime utility.
We discuss this issue in greater detail at the end of this section.
One of the few papers that considers outcomes is Monteiro and Turnovsky
(2008) who develop a two-sector endogenous growth model with physical and
human capital. The government provides one public service that enhances
the production of nal output and one public service that enhances the pro-
duction of human capital. Both are derived from the ow of public expendi-
ture. They present steady state growth rates and steady state welfare levels
for several di¤erent combinations of the tax rate and public spending com-
position (under two alternative settings of the remaining model parameters).
Whereas utility is derived from consumption, which in turn is derived from
nal output, the welfare benets of spending on the production of human
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capital are less direct. They therefore nd a signicant trade-o¤ between
growth and welfare maximization. As noted above, this is likely to result in
part from the dichotomous nature of the two public services.
The previous section has shown that it is di¢ cult to draw specic con-
clusions from comparisons between the growth- and welfare-maximizing tax
rates. As a result trade-o¤s in terms of scal policies are very di¢ cult to
predict if the precise model specication, and the specic values of key para-
meters, are unknown. To deal with this model and parameter uncertainty we
numerically evaluate the growth rates and welfare levels along the balanced
growth path for a large number of di¤erent values of the exogenous model
parameters. By doing so some general conclusions about growth and welfare
maximization can be derived even under model and parameter uncertainty
and for a large array of situations and contexts.
4.1 Methodology
The procedure used consists of two steps: rst, a large number of values for
each exogenous model parameter were generated. No assumptions regarding
the specic parameter values were made, but values were randomly drawn
from two distributions. Both distributions are truncated so that each pa-
rameter is allowed to vary across some (plausible) range. The lower bound
(l) and the upper bound (u) are chosen to reect theoretical restrictions,
econometric estimates and/or anecdotal evidence where available. The dis-
tributions assumed between the lower and upper bound include a Uniform
distribution and a symmetric Normal distribution (with mean  = (l+u)
2
, and
standard deviation d = (u l)
1:96
).
Table 2 summarizes the parameter assumptions; each parameter set in-
cludes values for all exogenous parameters in Models 1 and 2. The parame-
ter ranges are shown in Table 2. We generated 7728 parameter sets, based
on 7728 independent draws for each distribution.15 Tables 3 and 4 show
summary statistics for the simulated distributions resulting from the 7728
15The procedure was implemented in Maple. The programs are available upon request.
We originally generated 10,000 di¤erent parameter sets. This number decreased to 7,728
when we truncated the range of parameters according to the lower and upper bounds.
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Table 2: Exogenous parameter ranges and distribution
l u Distribution 1 Distribution 2
 1:001 3 Uniform Normal
 0:02 0:06 Uniform Normal
 0:1 0:45 Uniform Normal
 0 0:6 Uniform Normal
  1  0:001 Uniform Normal
Table 3: Normal parameter distribution
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
 2.002 0.443 1.001 2.999
 0.04 0.009 0.02 0.06
 0.273 0.078 0.1 0.45
 0.299 0.134 0 0.6
 -0.499 0.224 -1 -0.001
N 7728
independent draws.
Secondly, the maximization procedures, and the resulting outcomes in
both models, were solved numerically for the Uniformly and Normally dis-
tributed parameter values. The growth- and welfare-maximizing tax rates,
  and  , were calculated as shown in the previous section. To compare
both tax rates, the relative di¤erence is calculated as:(     ) 
 100 (17)
We then compare the growth rates and welfare levels that result from these
Table 4: Uniform parameter distribution
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
 2.002 0.581 1.001 2.999
 0.04 0.012 0.02 0.06
 0.273 0.101 0.1 0.45
 0.296 0.173 0 0.6
 -0.501 0.287 -1 -0.001
N 7728
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di¤erent growth- and welfare-maximizing scal policies. For Model 1, growth
rates and welfare levels along the balanced growth path under growth max-
imization ( and W ) and welfare maximization ( andW ), are calcu-
lated. The level of welfare along the balanced growth path is calculated based
on (14). Relative di¤erences are similarly calculated as:
(   )

 100 (18)
and
(W   W )
W 
 100 (19)
In Model 2, due to transitional dynamics, (14) is not identical to lifetime
utility. That is, while the welfare-maximizing tax rate yields the highest pos-
sible lifetime utility, it does not necessarily represent the highest welfare levels
along the balanced growth path. Owing to transitional dynamics, the com-
putation of lifetime utility is highly complex in endogenous growth models
with public nance and typically not performed so that we do not explicitly
compare welfare under either growth or welfare maximization. However, we
argue below that some conclusions can still be drawn.16
4.2 Results
Summary statistics for Model 1 are shown in Tables 5 and 6. The tables show
that, for both distributions, the mean and standard deviation of the relative
di¤erence between the growth- and welfare-maximizing tax rates are much
larger than for the relative di¤erence between the growth rate and welfare
levels under growth and welfare maximization. The mean di¤erence in tax
rates is calculated at 14%, while the mean di¤erence in growth rates that
result from these is less than 2.4% and the mean of the relative di¤erence of
welfare levels is less than 4.3%. For the Normal distribution, di¤erences are
smaller than for the Uniform distribution, reecting the lower probability of
extreme values with the Normal distribution. The standard deviations (of
16There are papers that take a similar approach to tackle parameter uncertainty, albeit
in di¤erent contexts (see for example Salhofer et al. (2001)).
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Table 5: Model 1 with Normal parameter distribution
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
  0.475 0.111 0.12 0.738
  0.505 0.096 0.179 0.752
relative di¤erence b/w tax rates 10.412 13.044 0 195.055
 0.104 0.054 0.01 0.423
 0.102 0.053 0.01 0.419
relative di¤erence b/w growth rates 1.61 2.346 0 20.577
relative di¤erence b/w welfare 2.544 4.982 0 77.562
N 7728
relative di¤erences) are also large in absolute terms for taxes but small for
growth.
This is a key result: the trade-o¤s in terms of tax policies of the type
found in previous sections exaggerate the trade-o¤s in terms of growth rate
and welfare level outcomes. For example, the largest relative di¤erence in tax
rates generated from the di¤erent parameterizations is 195%. This generates
a di¤erence in growth rates of just 16%. Figures 5 and 6 plot the relative
di¤erence in tax rates against the relative di¤erence in growth rates (Fig-
ure 5) and welfare levels (Figure 6) for all of the generated parameterization
sets (based on the Normal distribution). While there is a positive correla-
tion between the relative di¤erences in tax rates and relative di¤erences in
outcomes in both gures, large di¤erences in tax rates are associated with
generally smaller di¤erences in growth or welfare outcomes. Di¤erences in
the optimal tax rate are consistently associated with smaller di¤erences in
outcomes, especially in the case of growth rates (Figure 5).
Figures 7 and 8 shed more light on the distribution of the relative dif-
ferences for the Normal distribution. They show that for more than 75% of
the parameter sets that we generate, the relative di¤erences between growth
rates and welfare levels are generally below 5%. This suggests that trade-
o¤s between growth and welfare maximization tend to be very small in most
cases; hence maximizing growth and maximizing welfare yield roughly equiv-
alent outcomes. The key conclusion from this exercise is that this result is
not due to choices of particular parameter value combinations we might have
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Table 6: Model 1 with Uniform parameter distribution
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
  0.466 0.143 0.105 0.749
  0.499 0.126 0.125 0.772
relative di¤erence b/w tax rates 14.181 20.984 0.001 261.516
 0.114 0.076 0.007 0.583
 0.112 0.075 0.007 0.581
relative di¤erence b/w growth rates 2.384 3.478 0 28.568
relative di¤erence b/w welfare 4.268 9.559 0 185.425
N 7728
chosen, but rather holds across a large number of alternative sets. The rea-
son appears to be the relative atnessof both the tax-growth curve and
the tax-welfare curve between the growth- and welfare-maximizing tax rates.
Hence, in this region scal policy is relatively ine¤ective. Since growth is
essential for welfare, the tax rates typically do not di¤er to the extent that
growth rates (and hence welfare) fundamentally di¤er under both objectives.
Tables 7 and 8 show equivalent summary statistics for Model 2. First, the
tables show that, as in the case of Model 1, for both distributions the mean
and the standard deviation of the relative di¤erence between the growth- and
welfare-maximizing tax rates are much larger than the equivalent relative
di¤erences in growth rates under growth and welfare maximization. Again,
the assumed parameter distribution does not seem to matter. Figure 9, based
on the Normal distribution, conrms that while there is a correlation between
the relative di¤erences in tax rates and relative di¤erences in outcomes, the
former tend to be much larger.
Secondly, Tables 7 and 8 also show that the mean relative di¤erence in
growth rates between growth and welfare maximization is below 9%. Com-
pared to the model with public services, this is noticeably larger. The reason
is that with public capital there are transitional dynamics, with total welfare
driven to a lesser extent by the growth rate along the balanced growth path.
Therefore, growth- and welfare-maximizing tax rates, and hence growth rates,
di¤er rather more with public capital. Figure 10 sheds more light on the dis-
tribution of the relative di¤erences for the Normal distribution case. It shows
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Table 7: Model 2 with Normal parameter distribution
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
  0.321 0.06 0.112 0.471
  0.185 0.054 0.054 0.434
relative di¤erence b/w tax rates 42.776 10.306 0.593 67.345
 0.269 0.046 0.184 0.495
 0.246 0.052 0.148 0.494
relative di¤erence b/w growth rates 8.840 4.542 0.001 25.614
number of observations when W  > W  7727
N 7728
Table 8: Model 2 with Uniform parameter distribution
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
  0.318 0.08 0.104 0.493
  0.19 0.073 0.039 0.501
relative di¤erence b/w tax rates 41.121 13.767 0.02 67.882
 0.278 0.064 0.185 0.618
 0.257 0.072 0.138 0.618
relative di¤erence b/w growth rates 8.523 5.719 0 28.018
number of observations when W  > W  7727
N 7728
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Figure 5: Relative di¤erences of tax rates and growth rates in Model 1 (public
services ; Normal distribution)
that for 75% of the parameter sets, the relative di¤erence between growth
rates is less than 12.5% (e.g. 3% compared with 3.375%), suggesting that
growth rate trade-o¤s between growth and welfare maximization still tend
to be moderate in most cases.
In common with most papers that develop endogenous growth models
with public nance we do not compute lifetime utility where transitional
dynamics occur, due to the complexity of the exercise in this case. While
the standard approach in the literature to deal with transitional dynamics
is to approximate them, the reliability of using linearized systems as an ap-
proximation to the true non-linear system is unclear and, as Atolia et al.
(forthcoming) show, it may be problematic in some other contexts. This
leaves some doubt regarding the relative welfare level di¤erences in Model
2. Nevertheless, we believe that the di¤erence in terms of lifetime utility be-
tween growth and welfare maximization would remain small were transitional
dynamics to be considered.
Lifetime utility can be conceived as the sum of two components - the
utility during the transitional period, and utility along the balanced growth
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Figure 6: Relative di¤erences of tax rates and welfare levels in Model 1
(public services ; Normal distribution)
path. As shown in Tables 7 and 8, along the balanced growth path welfare is
typically larger under growth maximization than under welfare maximization
because the welfare-maximizing policy reects transitional dynamics. This
e¤ect dampens the welfare-reducing e¤ect of growth maximization. In addi-
tion and more importantly, the modest di¤erence between the growth rate
under growth and under welfare maximization are also likely to suggest that
the impact of switching regimes from growth to welfare maximization on the
economy, and therefore on lifetime utility, is small.
5 Conclusions
This paper has considered the di¤erence between growth and welfare maxi-
mization by comparing income tax rates under both growth and welfare max-
imization in generalizations of two established models of endogenous growth
with scal policy. It has also compared growth rates and welfare levels as
outcomes of scal policy in these models. Several conclusions can be drawn
from this exercise.
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Figure 7: Relative di¤erences of growth rates in Model 1 (public services ;
Normal distribution)
Firstly, comparisons between the growth- and welfare-maximizing tax
rates across several di¤erent models show that the central results of the ex-
isting literature are not robust to small changes in their underlying assump-
tions. The results depend crucially on the way that scal policy is assumed to
be e¤ective. In particular, it was shown that even if public services or public
capital enter the utility function, the relationship between the growth- and
welfare-maximizing tax rates is ambiguous, and the two may even coincide.
These comparisons show that for this class of endogenous growth models,
without exact knowledge of the model parameters, di¤erences between the
growth- and welfare-maximizing scal policies are hard to predict.
The second conclusion modies the policy concerns raised by the rst.
The relative di¤erences between growth- and welfare-maximizing tax rates
tend to be much larger than relative di¤erences between growth rates for
models with public services and public capital, and welfare levels for models
with public services. It was shown that relative welfare and growth trade-o¤s
in models with public services are very small, while in models with public cap-
ital, the growth (and most likely the welfare) trade-o¤ is larger but still seems
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Figure 8: Relative di¤erences of welfare in Model 1 (public services ; Normal
distribution)
moderate. Parameter uncertainty was handled by assuming a distribution
function of all parameters instead of adopting specic values. Conditional
on the general class of models, this would appear to imply that the choice
between growth and welfare maximization is unlikely to have large impacts
on growth and, in the case of models with public services, on welfare levels.
The Barro and Futagami Models and their extensions form key refer-
ence points in policy discussions of the long-run growth e¤ects of scal pol-
icy. Nevertheless, growth-maximizing and welfare-maximizing scal policies
could be compared in a more general framework. While one option is to
include the choice between labor and leisure explicitly, as for instance in
Turnovsky (1999), rather than treating labor supply as exogenously xed,
this model extension seems unlikely to change our results qualitatively. The
reason is that the growth-maximizing tax rate in our models is determined
by the technology of production and by the nature of the productive e¤ects
of public spending. It is conceivable that the welfare-maximizing tax rate
changes; however it can reasonably be expected that these changes are not
large enough to signicantly change our results because di¤erences between
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Figure 9: Relative di¤erences of tax rates and growth rates in Model 2 (public
capital ; Normal distribution)
growth maximization and welfare maximization would continue to be driven
by the factors that we identied in this paper. In addition, if utility is spec-
ied in a way that the utility-enhancing e¤ects of public spending do not
a¤ect the marginal utility of consumption and leisure in relative terms, they
leave the choice between labour and leisure una¤ected suggesting that for
simplicity, the labour supply of households can be considered as exogenously
given.
A more interesting extension which future research could tackle, would
be to consider a combination of Models 1 and 2 in which the government
simultaneously provides public services and public capital and therefore also
sets the shares of spending of public services and of public investment, which
would introduce an additional scal policy instrument.17 This would allow
comparisons of the growth- and welfare-maximizing composition of public
spending, and also allow interactions between the level of taxation and the
composition of public spending to be explored. For the Cobb-Douglas tech-
17Ghosh and Roy (2004) and Misch et al. (2011) have developed such models for exam-
ple.
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Figure 10: Relative di¤erences of growth rates in Model 2 (public capital ;
Normal distribution)
nology case, Ghosh and Roy (2004) show that the optimal tax rate and the
optimal spending shares are interrelated (in the sense that the tax rate a¤ects
the optimal public spending composition and vice versa). Similarly, Misch et
al. (2011) show that the optimal tax rate and the share of resources spent on
public services are interrelated when public and private inputs to production
are complements under growth maximization. These ndings imply that in
a model with public capital and public services, the relation between the
growth- and welfare-maximizing scal policies would become more still more
complex.18
The results of this paper, though derived from relatively abstract models,
have important policy implications. The knowledge available to governments
18To illustrate, Misch et al. (2011) demonstrate that in a second-best situation where the
shares of public spending on public services and of public investment are not set at their
growth-maximizing values, the growth-maximizing level of taxation is higher compared
to a rst-best situation. While the optimal tax rate and the optimal public spending
composition are also interrelated under welfare maximization as shown by Ghosh and Roy
(2004), it is unclear if second-best interactions under welfare maximization are similar to
the case of growth maximization. Thus, conclusions regarding di¤erences between growth-
and welfare maximizing tax rates may be a¤ected by how the public spending shares are
set and vice versa.
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is inevitably imperfect, such that they typically face informational constraints
regarding household preferences and the magnitude of any utility-enhancing
e¤ects of public services. Further, because social welfare is harder to mea-
sure than output, governments are often tempted to treat output growth
maximization as a proxy for maximizing welfare. The results of this paper
suggest, however, that the implied welfare trade-o¤s between growth and
welfare maximization may be small; we nd many cases where the growth-
maximizing scal policy yields roughly the same welfare outcome as the
welfare-maximizing policy. If growth rates are indeed susceptible to scal
policy, and if the growth-enhancing e¤ect of public services, or public cap-
ital, are easier to measure, then benevolent governments might reasonably
seek to maximize the growth rate instead as a second-best strategy. In ad-
dition, the results show that scal policy tends to be relatively ine¤ective
in altering welfare levels and growth rates between the growth- and welfare-
maximizing tax rates, at least in models with public services. Changes in
scal policy within this interval can be expected to have only a small impact
on the economy.
Finally, the representative householdnature of the models considered
here are such that they are clearly not well suited to considering intra-
temporal but inter-household distributional aspects though this is clearly
an important scal policy trade-o¤ for many governments. Where some pub-
lic spending impacts both on output growth and welfare of an individual
household and a¤ects the distribution of that output across households, cap-
turing these trade-o¤s is likely to require a much more complex model of the
relevant interactions and choices.19
19See, for example, Li and Sarte (2004) who extend a Barro-type model to consider the
impacts of progressive income taxation and productive public spending in the presence of
heterogeneous households.
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A Appendix
A.1 The Welfare-Maximizing Tax Rate in Model 2
The present-value Hamiltonian that corresponds to the maximization prob-
lem of the government together with the rst-order conditions of the house-
hold yield
1 +

1  
x
z
1
ykG
= (1  ) yk
ykG
(A.1)
with x = c=k and z = kG=k. This condition determines  . The steady
state values of x and z, ~x and ~z, can be derived from (A.2) and (A.3). Along
the balanced growth path,
_kG
kG
= _c
c
holds which can be written as

y
kG
=
1

((1  )yk   ) (A.2)
Likewise, from _k
k
= _c
c
,
x = (1  )y
k
  1

((1  )yk) + 
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(A.3)
A.2 Growth- and Welfare-Maximizing Tax Rates in
the Centralized Economy
This appendix derives the optimal tax rates under growth and welfare max-
imization in the centralized economy. In contrast to the market economy
considered above, the central planner takes into account the positive exter-
nality of private investment that arises because private investment increases
output which in turn results in higher levels of public revenue and thereby
higher levels of productive public services.
In Model 1, the growth- and welfare-maximizing tax rates are derived as
follows. In (1), g is substituted using (3). Solving for y and deriving with
respect to k results in an expression of the social marginal returns of private
investment. By using the resulting expression for yk, one can obtain the
growth- and welfare-maximizing tax rates in the centralized economy,  c and
 c , in the same way as in the market economy.
Again using numerical examples where closed-forms are not available, our
results show that with  = 0,  c = 
 and  c = 
 even if  > 0. However,
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once  =  1, there are signicant di¤erences between the centralized and the
market economy. Our numerical examples suggest that the optimal tax rates
are signicantly below the equivalents on the market economy. For instance,
in the case where  = 0:3; and with the remaining model parameters set as in
Figures 1 and 2, the growth-maximizing tax rate in the centralized economy
equals 83% of that in the market economy, and the welfare-maximizing tax
rate amounts to 96% of that in the centralized economy.
In Model 2, the growth-maximizing tax rate can be obtained by implicitly
di¤erentiating (11) where yk is the social marginal return to private capital.
Under welfare-maximization, the government sets c, k,  and kG in a way
that maximizes welfare. Numerical examples with  = 0:3 and with the
remaining exogenous model parameters set as in Figures 3 and 4 suggest
that the picture now slightly changes. Whereas with  = 0 the growth-
maximizing tax rates in the centralized and market economies continue to
be identical ( c = 
), the welfare-maximizing tax rate in the centralized
economy,  c amounts only to about 91% of its equivalent in the market
economy. With  =  1, growth- and welfare-maximizing tax rates in the
centralized and in the market economies di¤er. The growth-maximizing tax
rate amounts to only 82% of the growth-maximizing tax rate in the market
economy. By contrast, the welfare-maximizing tax rate in the centralized
economy now exceeds that in the market economy:  c = 1:04
. A more
systematic comparison of the growth- and welfare-maximizing tax rates in
the centralized economy is beyond the scope of this paper, but these examples
suggest there may be merit in undertaking this exercise within our modeling
framework as optimal tax rates appear to di¤er between the centralized and
the market economies.
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